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The Cat in the Hat
the sun did not shine. it was too wet to play. so we sat in the house all that cold, cold, wet day. i sat there with sally. we sat there, we two. and i said, 'how i wish we had something to do!' too wet to go out and too cold to play ball. so we sat in the house. we did nothing at all. so all we could do was to sit! sit! sit! sit! and we did not like it. not one little bit. and then something went BUMP! how that bump made us jump! we looked! then we saw him step in on the mat! we looked! and we saw him! the cat in the hat! and he said to us, 'why do you sit there like that?' 'i know it is wet and the sun is not sunny. but we can have lots of good fun that is funny!' 'i know some good games we could play,' said the cat. 'i know some new tricks,' said the cat in hte hat. 'a lot of good tricks. i will show them to you. your mother will not mind at all if i do.' then sally and i did not know what to say. our mother was out of the house for the day. but our fish said, 'no! no! make that cat go away! tell that cat in the hat you do NOT want to play. he should not be here. he should not be about. he should not be here when your mother is out!' 'now! now! have no fear. have no fear!' said the cat. 'my tricks are not bad,' said the cat in the hat. 'why, we can have lots of good fun, if you wish, with a game that i call up-up-up with a fish!' 'put me down!' said the fish. 'this is no fun at all! put me down!' said the fish. 'i do NOT wish to fall!' 'have no fear!' said the cat. 'i will not let you fall. i will hold you up high as i stand on a ball. with a book one one hand! and a cup on my hat! but that is not ALL i can do! said the cat... 'look at me! look at me now!' said the cat. 'with a cup and a cake on the top of my hat! i can hold up TWO books! i can hold up the fish! and a little toy ship! and some milk on a dish! and look! i can hop up and down on the ball! but that is not all! oh, no. that is not all... 'look at me! look at me! look at me NOW! it is fun to have fun but you have to know how. i can hold up the cup and the milk and the cake! i can hold up these books! and the fish on a rake! i can hold the toy ship and a little toy man! and look! with my tail i can hold a red fan! i can fan with the fan as i hop on the ball! but that is not all. oh, no. that is not all...' that is what the cat said... then he fell on his head! he came down with a bump from up there on the ball. and sally and i, we saw ALL the things fall! and our fish came down, too. he fell into a pot! he said, 'do i like this? oh, no! i do not. this is not a good game,' said our fish as he lit. 'no, i do not like it, not one little bit!' 'now look what you did!' said the fish to the cat. 'now look at this house! look at this! look at that! you sank our toy ship, sank it deep in the cake. you shook up our house and you bent our new rake. you SHOULD NOT be here when our mother is not. you get out of this house!' said the fish in the pot. 'but i like to be here. oh, i like it a lot!' said the cat in the hat to the fish in the pot. 'i will NOT go away. i do NOT wish to go! and so,' said the cat in the hat, 'so so so... i will show you another good game that i know!' and then he ran out. and, then, fast as a fox, the cat in the hat came back in with a box. a big red wood box. it was shut with a hook. 'now look at this trick,' said the cat. 'take a look!' then he got up on top with a tip of his hat. 'i call this game fun-in-a-box,' said the cat. 'in this box are two things i will show to you now. you will like these two things,' said the cat with a bow. 'i will pick up the hook. you will see something new. two things. and i call them Thing One and Thing Two. these Things will not bite you. they want to have fun.' then, out of the box came Thing Two and Thing One! and they ran to us fast. they said, 'how do you do? would you like to shake hands with Thing One and Thing Two?' and sally and i did not know what to do. so we had to shake hands with Thing One and Thing Two. we shook their two hands. but our fish said, 'no! no! those Things should not be in this house! make them go! they should not be here when your mother is not! put them out! put them out!' said the fish in the pot. 'have no fear, little fish,' said the cat in the hat. 'these Things are good Things.' and he gave them a pat. 'they are tame. oh, so tame! they have come here to play. they will give you some fun on this wet, wet, wet day.' now, here is a game that they like,' said the cat. 'they like to fly kites,' said the cat in the hat. 'no! not in the house!' said the fish in the pot. 'they should not fly kites in a house! they should not. oh, the things they will bump! oh, the things they will hit! oh, i do not like it! not one little bit!' then sally and i saw them run down the hall. we saw those two Things bump their kites on the wall! bump! thump! thump! bump! down the wall in the hall. thing two and thing one! they ran up! they ran down! on the string of one kite we saw mother's new gown! her gown with the dots that are pink, white and red. then we saw one kite bump on the head of her bed! then those things ran about with big bumps, jumps and kicks and with hops and big thumps and all kinds of bad tricks. and i said, 'i do NOT like the way that they play! if mother could see this, oh, what would she say!' then our fish said, 'look! look!' and our fish shook with fear. 'your mother is on her way home! do you hear? oh, what will she do to us? what will she say? oh, she will not like it to find us this way!' 'so DO something! fast!' said the fish. 'do you hear! i saw her. your mother! your mother is near! so, as fast as you can, think of something to do! you will have to get rid of thing one and thing two!' so, as fast as i could, i went after my net. and i said, 'with my net i can get them i bet. i bet, with my net, i can get those things yet!' then i let down my net. it came down with a PLOP! and i had them! at last! those two things had to stop. then i said to the cat, 'now you do as i say. you pack up those Things and you take them away!' 'oh dear!' said the cat. 'you did not like our game... oh dear. what a shame! what a shame! what a shame!' then he shut up the things in the box with the hook. and the cat went away with a sad kind of look. 'that is good,' said the fish. 'he has gone away. yes. but your mother will come. she will find this big mess! and this mess is so big and so deep and so tall, we can not pick it up. there is no way at all!' and THEN! who was back in the house? why, the cat! 'have no fear of this mess,' said the cat in the hat. 'i always pick up all my playthings and so... i will show you another good trick that i know!' then we saw him pick up all the things that were down. he picked up the cake, and the rake, and the gown, and the milk, and the strings, and the books, and the dish, and the fan, and the cup, and the ship, and the fish. and he put them away. then he said, 'that is that.' and then he was gone with a tip of his hat. then our mother came in and she said to us two, 'did you have any fun? tell me. what did you do?' and sally and i did not know what to say. should we tell her the things that went on there that day? should we tell her about it? now, what SHOULD we do? well... what would YOU do if your mother asked YOU?
Brown Vs. Board of Edu
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment -- even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be equal. (a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public education. (b) The question presented in these cases must be determined not on the basis of conditions existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. (c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools, such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. (d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal. (e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, has no place in the field of public education. (f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to the forms of the decrees. Opinion WARREN MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each instance, they had been denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by this Court in Plessy v. Fergson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the Negro schools. The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal," and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court. Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then-existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history with respect to segregated schools is the status of public education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools, supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and sciences, as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states, and compulsory school attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education. In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The doctrine of "separate but equal" did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases, all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these cases was it necessary to reexamine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education. In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other "tangible" factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on public education. In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868, when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896, when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws. Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it does. In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". . . his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession." Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs: Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system. Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected. We conclude that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily subordinated to the primary question -- the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions 4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term The Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1, 1954. It is so ordered.